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Introduction
Results-based financing (RBF) programs use incentives, conditional on the achievement of results, to motivate the provision of more and better services, with the ultimate goal of improving final outcomes such as increased learning among students or better health outcomes for patients.
2 RBF is growing in popularity among governments, multilateral institutions and private donors as a promising policy tool for improving development effectiveness and achieving objectives such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In this paper, we propose a simple cost-benefit framework for establishing targets in the context of health RBF programs, though the model can be easily adapted to other sectors.
RBF models are proposed as policy tools for attenuating the principle-agent problems inherent in the contracting of services (Ross, 1973; Savedoff, 2010) . The design of an RBF model will depend on the particular development challenge that the policymaker seeks to overcome and must be carefully considered for each context 3 ; however, while many variants of RBF models exist, at the heart of any RBF program is the incentive model that establishes the relationship between incentives offered by the principle and the outputs or outcomes achieved by the agent. In the context of the health sector, one general class of supply-side RBF programs provides payments linked directly to the provision of health services. 4 Another class of programs provides incentive payments linked directly to the achievement of results and will typically include specific targets for the outputs or outcomes of interest. For example, the agent may be offered an incentive of $X if child mortality in a particular region is reduced by Y%. Under these models, targets are typically expressed as a change in health indicators that must be achieved in order to trigger an incentive payment. Payments can be "all or nothing," with providers receiving the full incentive only if agreed upon targets are met, or they can be structured as a function of the level of compliance with the target.
5
Once a decision has been made by the policymaker to use a target-based model, a key next step will be to define the set of output or outcome indicators that the RBF program will incentivize and to set the targets for each one. Documentation available for existing health RBF programs shows a wide range of approaches to target setting. 6 For example, some programs used national objectives and international standards, including programs in Belize (Vanzie, Hsi, Beith, and Eichler, 2010) , Ethiopia (De, Zelelew, and Eichler, 2010) and Rwanda (Rusa, Schneidam, Fritshce, and Musango, 2009) . In other cases, targets were set through negotiations between the payer and service provider, including in Argentina, where targets were negotiated annually (Cortez et al., 2009), and Afghanistan (Naimoli and Vergeer, 2010) . Other approaches to target setting outside explicit RBF programs, such as the setting of MDGs and 2 For an in-depth discussion of RBF concepts and a glossary of terms, see Musgrove, P., 2011. 3 A discussion of the design of RBF models and selection of appropriate indicators is outside the scope of this paper. 4 For example, fee-for-service payments can be adjusted for measures of quality using balanced score cards, measures of compliance with clinical guidelines, or other means of verification. On the demand side, conditional cash transfers pay individuals or households contingent on the use of specified health services. 5 These can be continuous or discrete. Under a continuous function, a fraction of the incentive is paid for each fraction of the target that is achieved. Discrete models can take the form of a step function, with portions of the incentive paid for achieving intermediate targets. 6 Overall, we found few cases of well-documented, published experiences.
SDGs, involve the use of expert panels 7 or in the case of Healthy People, a U.S.-based initiative, a hybrid approach including expert judgment, international comparisons, total coverage or elimination targets consistent with other national programs, and "better than best," a data-driven approach, which aims "to surpass the value achieved for any target group at baseline" (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2000a , 2000b , 2000c .
In this paper, we propose a simple cost-benefit model for setting targets and illustrate its application to the Mesoamerican Health Initiative. In this case, targets were negotiated between the initiative (principal) and recipient countries (agent), so the model provided a quantitative economic framework and starting point for negotiations on program targets. While the model requires a number of assumptions, these can be agreed upon up front by the principal and agent, providing a transparent and replicable process for both parties. We argue that the model proposed here, when coupled with other sources of information and analysis, such as microsimulations, impact results from similar interventions, power analysis, and expert opinion, can be a valuable input to the target-setting process.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the cost-benefit model, and section 3 discusses the data sources needed for estimation. Section 4 presents an overview of verification data requirements. Then, section 5 presents an application of the model to the Mesoamerican Health Initiative, and section 6 discusses how the results of the model were complemented by additional sources of information to reach a final set of targets. Section 7 presents our conclusions. We also make available a companion Excel spreadsheet that comes pre-programmed with the basic cost-benefit model and that can be adapted by the user for specific applications. Appendix 2 provides a step-by-step user guide for the Excel tool.
A Cost-Benefit Model for Setting Targets
We use a simple cost-benefit model as the starting point for setting targets. The model equates the total estimated value of benefits generated through the RBF to the cost of the program. We solve the equation for the minimum change per outcome, such that total benefits are greater than total costs. The estimated outcome change is then added to the indicator's projected counterfactual change (the change that would have occurred anyway in the absence of the program) and baseline level to produce a minimum target level.
Take the set of RBF payment indicators, i, that the program intends to pay for. Typically, this set of indicators is directly related to the key outputs and outcomes that the policymaker or principal wants to achieve with the RBF program.
The basic cost-benefit model is:
7 In the case of the MDGs, goals were set by a consensus of experts from the United Nations, IMF, OECD and the World Bank.
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/gti.htm.
where is the change in indicator i generated by the program (the program's impact), is the intervention's population size, and is the value or price of a one unit improvement in indicator i. is the total cost of the RBF program. Equation (1) establishes that the total value of benefits generated by the intervention must be greater than or equal to the cost of the intervention.
The minimum target, , is then equal to plus the current (baseline) level of the indicator, b , and the "counterfactual" change, that is, the level of the indicator that would have prevailed in the absence of the RBF program, which we will call ℎ :
To solve equation (1) we make the simplifying assumption that = , that is, that the magnitude of change (in percentage points) caused by the program is equal for each indicator. A more nuanced model could weight each differently according to the priorities or perceived policy preferences for each particular outcome. The minimum program impact per indicator is given by:
Substituting (3) in (2) we have:
Thus, the minimum target level for indicator i is a function of the change "purchased" by the RBF program, such that the total benefits of the program outweigh the costs, the baseline level (i.e., the pre-program condition of the target population), and the change in that indicator that would be expected in the absence of RBF.
Data
In order to estimate T i , we will require data for each of the parameters in equation (4). We can measure b empirically through baseline data from a representative sample of the target population. 8 The parameter ℎ is the change in outcome i that would have prevailed in the absence of the program at a future date and is an unknown parameter at the time of target setting. We approximate ℎ using historical trend data to estimate the indicator's change over a given pre-intervention period, and we assume that in the absence of the program, the indicator would continue on the same trajectory, although more sophisticated micro-simulation could also be done. Alternatively, ℎ could be estimated ex-post using a control group (i.e., through a randomized controlled trial) and factored in to the model in the post-intervention period. While estimating the counterfactual through an impact evaluation would be an optimal alternative, it could also be more costly if the impact evaluation requires collecting additional data on a control group.
, the cost of the program, , and the number of individuals that are expected to benefit from each sub-component of the intervention, N i , are known parameters from the program's operational design.
The final parameter needed to calculate the model is v i , the value or price of one unit of improvement in outcome i. Various methodologies have been proposed to estimate the economic value of improvement in health outcomes, including contingent valuation methods and revealed preferences (Cawley, 2008; Kuhmerker and Hartman, 2007; Trude, Au, and Christianson, 2006) . For our application, we propose an estimate of v i based on a commonly used parameter of disability, the disability-adjusted life year (DALY), valued at yearly gross national income (GNI) per capita. One disability-adjusted life year can be thought of as one lost year of "healthy" life. The concept, considered a measure of the "burden of disease," was first introduced by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank in 1994 (Murray, 1994) . DALYs combine "time lived with a disability and the time lost due to premature mortality" (Murray, 1994, p. 441 ). An attractive aspect of this metric for our purposes is that it combines the burden of mortality and morbidity (non-fatal health problems) into a single number. Additionally, the concept converts the burdens imposed by all potential health issues into a consistent unit, which allows comparison between the burdens imposed by different ailments. The DALY is widely used by WHO and is the metric of choice for planning decisions by numerous organizations. 9 In the context of a costing analysis, a DALY represents the number of disability-free years that are gained due to a particular health intervention. Gaining a DALY through an intervention reduces the burden of disease; that is, it is equivalent to averting the loss of a DALY.
To calculate v i we associate each outcome indicator i with the corresponding WHO estimations of the total burden of disease, in DALYs, for the corresponding sub-population and health condition. We then calculate DALYs per capita as the national burden of disease divided by the total population in the age bracket that would have been affected by that particular ailment in the absence of treatment. In order to obtain a monetary value, we then need to associate a monetary value with each DALY per capita. The cost-benefit literature presents a range of estimates for the value of a DALY. For example, a review of potable water interventions (Edwards, 2010) reports that the value of a DALY fluctuates between two-fifths and five times the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita; however, Edwards also points out that the "standard" (1993) methodology for the DALY is primarily based on the human capital approach, and the formula for the DALY would imply that its monetary value is equal to GDP per capita. , 2006; WHO, 2006) . According to the WHO, DALYs for a disease or a health condition are calculated as the sum of the Years of Life Lost (YLL) due to premature mortality, and the Years Lost due to Disability (YLD) for incident cases of the health condition, that is: = + , where = × and N=number of deaths and L=standard life expectancy at age of death in years. YLL measures the incident stream of lost years of life, and so this incidence perspective is also used in the calculation of YLD. That is, to estimate YLD for a particular ailment in a specific period of time, the number of incidents in that period is multiplied by the average duration of the ailment, and by a weight that classifies the severity of the condition within a scale between 0 (perfect health) and 1 (dead). So without taking into consideration social preferences, YLD is defined as = × × , where I=number of cases, DW=disability weight, and L=average duration of case until remission or death (in years).
an economic benefit of one year's per capita income. Hence, an intervention can be considered highly cost-effective 10 if each DALY averted costs less than one year of average per capita income, while an intervention is cost-effective if each DALY averted costs less than three times the average annual income.
In accordance with these standards, we conservatively equate the value of a DALY per capita to the GNI per capita in the application of the proposed model. Thus, v i is estimated for each outcome i as the DALY per capita for the associated condition and population times GNI per capita.
Target Verification
Although targets will be verified at a future date, the data sources and sample requirements for each indicator should be agreed upon by the principal and agent at the outset. Data sources may include independently audited administrative data, population-based surveys, or other appropriate sources. For indicators based on probability samples, power calculations should be performed to determine the sample sizes required to verify compliance with agreed targets.
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The estimated target, , is the minimum level that a target must meet in order to produce a positive cost-benefit ratio. As such, a target will be met if the actual outcome level measured for indicator i is greater than or equal to the established target. For count variables such as the number of patients served in a given time period, this comparison is straightforward. For indicators based on population estimates, such as the prevalence or incidence of a health condition, actual outcomes may fall short of the target but be within the 95% confidence region (or other pre-determined interval). To minimize gaming, we recommend establishing the target compliance rule at baseline using the following guidelines:
1.
≥ , where is sample mean of the actual outcome for indicator i, and 2.
* > b * + ℎ * , where * is the confidence region around when = and b * + ℎ * is the confidence region around the counterfactual outcome level That is, a target is achieved when the sample mean of the actual outcome is greater than or equal to the agreed upon target, and the 95% confidence region for the outcome should exclude the outcome level that would have prevailed in the absence of the program. When estimating the population mean, larger sample sizes will result in narrower confidence regions and are thus advantageous to both the principal and the agent in terms of minimizing the probability of false positives and false negatives, respectively; however, the sample size for estimating should be set such that confidence regions around do not overlap with the confidence region around the outcome level that would have been achieved without the program. Condition 2 has practical implications for the target-setting process, since it implies that in addition to meeting the costbenefit requirements of equation (4), targets for indicators based on population-based statistics 10 The Choosing Interventions that are Cost-Effective (CHOICE) project is a WHO initiative developed in 1998 with the objective of providing policymakers with the evidence for deciding on the interventions and programs that maximize health using the available resources. Following the recommendations of the CMH's report, CHOICE utilizes GDP as an indicator to define the following three categories of cost-effectiveness: highly cost-effective interventions (corresponding to less than one GDP per capita); cost-effective interventions (between one and three times GDP per capita); and non-cost-effective interventions (more than three times GDP per capita). must be estimated using sufficiently large samples so as to distinguish the target from the counterfactual level. If funding for data collection is insufficient to meet condition 2 under the target determined through equation (4), the minimum target will be set above at the minimum level that satisfies condition 2 under the existing budget constraint (or if that level is unrealistic, the indicator needs to be dropped or substituted).
Application of the Model to Salud Mesoamerica 2015
Salud Mesoamerica 2015 (SM2015) is a health RBF initiative funded by the Gates Foundation, the Carlos Slim Foundation, and the Government of Spain, and executed through the InterAmerican Development Bank. SM2015 seeks to reduce health inequalities by extending coverage and improving the quality of health interventions for the poorest 20% of households in the region, focusing primarily on maternal and child health. As a public-private partnership, the initiative provides grants equal to 50% of the project value, and governments in the Mesoamerican region contribute the other 50%. In addition, the initiative offers governments a results-based incentive payment of 25% of the total value of the funding envelope. Targets are agreed upon with governments for a set of key payment indicators directly related to the priority health outcomes that the initiative seeks to improve. If a weighted average of 80% of targets is achieved at the end of each 18-month funding period, then the government receives the "performance tranche" incentive payment.
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We apply the target-setting model to the case of SM2015 El Salvador, 13 where performance incentives linked to final health outcomes are paid, in accordance to program guidelines, at the end of a 36-month period. 14 Table 1 presents the list of outcome indicators selected by the initiative and government for payment, based on the primary objectives of the intervention in El Salvador.
For each of the 10 indicators, we will apply the target-setting model to calculate the minimum target that meets the condition set out in equation (4) Typical levels of power are 0.8 or 0.9, and significance of 5% is standard. If observations are clustered (for example, by village or health clinic), the intra-cluster correlation can be approximated using baseline data. 12 For more information, see http://www.sm2015.org. 13 El Salvador was the first country in the initiative to develop an operation and set targets for its performance framework. 14 In the case of El Salvador, SM2015 established two funding tranches, at 18 and 36 months from the beginning of the program.
Targets presented here are for the 36-month performance payment linked to final health outcomes. Targets for the first 18-month period were based on output and process indicators related to the implementation of the program, with targets linked to acceptable completion (for example, 90%) of the activities financed by the program over the initial 18-month period (not shown here). where "Total DALYs Maternal Conditions 15-59 yro" is the estimated total burden of disease for all maternal conditions for women aged 15-59 years in El Salvador. 16 Given that health benefits are likely to accrue over the lifetime of an individual, we need to estimate the present value of v i over some time horizon while discounting future value at a determined discount rate. In the context of maternal-child health interventions such as those supported by SM2015, this could be the expected life expectancy of a child or mother at the time of the intervention. For the present analysis, v i is calculated assuming a horizon of 20 years and a standard discount rate of 12% percent. Furthermore, we assume that benefits accrue throughout the entire three-year intervention period, though it is likely that the actual accrual period will be shorter given that benefits are only generated once the intervention is operational, with services being delivered on the ground.
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For the final two parameters in equation (4), baseline values for each indicator, b , are measured through a population-based, representative baseline survey conducted in intervention areas, which was commissioned by SM2015. Finally, in the absence of historical data for the specific intervention areas, the counterfactual change ℎ is calculated using historical trend data for available indicators from existing nationally representative health surveys for El Salvador, and we assume that in the absence of SM2015, these trends would have continued over the course of the intervention period.
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Plugging the data into equation (3), we estimate = 0.079. That is, for the case of El Salvador, the interventions financed by SM2015 must cause a change of at least 7.9 percentage points for each final health outcome so that the total value of benefits generated by the program is equal to the total cost. Applying equation (4), we add to the baseline levels (column 1 of table 1) and estimated historical trends to obtain a target value for each individual indicator. Results are presented in column 2 of table 1. For example, for the modern contraceptive prevalence rate, a target of at least 53% (up from 42% at baseline) should be attained after three years of intervention in order to satisfy the cost-benefit condition required by the model.
We note that some of the estimated targets in this application are over 100%, for example, in the case of the indicator "antenatal care before the first trimester," for which baseline levels, at 85%, are already quite high. In our experience, at least in the context of health outcomes, target rates much higher than 95% may be impractical (for example, if some sub-populations always refuse treatment), and so a ceiling of 95% was agreed upon for all indicators. It is important to note that when putting the model to work, the initial targets determined by the model can be updated in an iterative process, adjusting the relative value of individual ′ such that the relationship established in equation (1) is preserved.
Target-Setting Process in Salud Mesoamerica 2015
In this section, we discuss how final targets were set in the context of SM2015 El Salvador. SM2015 operational guidelines establish that outcome indicators and targets are negotiated and agreed upon between the initiative and governments. To inform the negotiation process, the initiative commissioned a number of inputs. First, an in-depth review of the literature and international experiences was conducted for each payment indicator to gather the range of impact estimates achieved through different types of interventions. The literature reviews consider case studies and program evaluations from the region (and internationally when relevant), placing emphasis on rigorous studies with internal and external validity that measure the effects of the types of interventions financed by SM2015 on final outcomes. Second, multicountry data sets were used to produce historical trends and levels for relevant indicators, both within the specific country and for countries in the region.
SM2015 guidelines establish that targets for population-based indicators be measured through surveys conducted by an independent third party, and each country has a pre-specified budget ceiling for monitoring and evaluation. In this context, as discussed in section 4, a third important input to the target-setting process is power estimates to determine necessary sample sizes for baseline and endline surveys that would be required to detect statistically significant changes in outcomes. Sample sizes are calculated with a power of 0.9 and significance levels of 0.05 (mean levels, intraclass correlations and design effects are estimated with existing surveys). If the sample size necessary to detect a proposed target was larger than the sample afforded under the initiative, a replacement indicator was sought in order to satisfy the minimum power requirement of 0.8 while remaining within the initiative's budget constraints for data collection.
Finally, the target-setting process incorporated information about the country's specific operational requirements using expert consultations. This process was meant to capture context-specific information and constraints that may not be reflected by the more quantitative inputs described above. Operational considerations include the specific interventions being financed, operational capacity of implementing agencies at the national and local levels, disbursement rate and execution capacity, and other context-specific aspects that might affect the achievable target proposed for a given indicator. In the case of El Salvador, expert consultations were conducted with international RBF experts, government officials from the ministry of health, fiduciary and procurement specialists within the government and the Bank, and Bank sector specialists with extensive experience in the country.
The target-setting process for SM2015 in El Salvador began by agreeing on an initial list of payment indicators. Then, over the course of a two-day meeting held in San Salvador, representatives from the government and the initiative analyzed and debated the various sources of information described above for each indicator until a mutually agreed upon target was established. For each indicator, the starting point of the negotiation was the target proposed by the cost-benefit model discussed in this paper. The additional information described above was then taken into consideration when arguing for a deviation from the target established by the model. For example, after reviewing international evidence on a specific intervention or considering the local experience of the ministry of health in addressing a specific health condition, the indicator might be adjusted up or down. Of the 10 payment indicators included in the RBF model in El Salvador, final targets for five indicators were set at levels above those established by the model, four were set below the targets predicted by the model (two of these simply brought targets of 100% or more down to the maximum agreed target level of 95%), and one was equal to the target given by the model. As individual indicator targets were agreed upon, the cost-benefit model was updated to ensure that the cost-benefit relationship established by equation (1) was maintained. In fact, the final payment targets negotiated in El Salvador (if achieved) produce benefits that are 1.6 times the cost of the operation.
Conclusion
This paper presents a simple cost-benefit model for setting targets in the context of an RBF program. While here we apply the model to an RBF program in the health sector, the basic principles of the model can be easily adapted to other sectors. The ultimate goal of the model is to assist policymakers with establishing an objective starting point for defining targets. The model relies on a number of important inputs and assumptions, including a prediction of the counterfactual change for a given outcome, an accurate valuation of benefits, a time horizon over which benefits accrue, and a discount rate; however, these parameters can be agreed upon up front by the users of the model, and sensitivity analysis can be performed to estimate upper and lower bounds on a target, given more or less conservative assumptions around these parameters. In this sense, we argue that applying an economic cost-benefit framework when setting targets is a useful exercise that provides a quantitative, transparent and replicable process for defining the targets that will ultimately determine whether and how much of an RBF incentive payment is made.
